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COMMENT
THE UNITED STATES AS A DEFENDANT IN ADMIRALTY
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the scope of activities of the United States government
has expanded greatly and now covers many hitherto "private" fields
including, among others, the ownership of merchant vessels. The extent
of the government's tort liability arising from the operation of these ships
is a subject which has occupied the attention of both Congress and the
courts. It is a subject which this comment will attempt to present and
evaluate in the light of applicable legislative and judicial developments.
HISTORY
An ancient legal maxim declared that the King could do no wrong.'
From this adage grew the modern doctrine of sovereign immunity from
suit. Several theories were advanced to justify the doctrine, ranging from,
the superiority of the sovereign to any law the sovereign may create,2 on
the one hand, to the positivistic Justice Holmes' approach of plain
practicality3 on the other. Regardless of the rationale employed, all American
decisions hold, in varying degree, that the United States is immune from
suit unless permission to sue has been granted.4 As the function of the
government expanded and its contact with the people became more
personal, the severity of this doctrine became the subject of attack.5 This
was especially true in the field of Admiralty where the United States had
1. In the Matter of Wadsworth and the Queen of Spain, 17 Q.B. 171, 117
Eng. Rep. 1246 (1851).
2. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922).
3. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception
or absolute theory but on the logical and practical grounds that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
that right depends.
et. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940).
The reasons for this immunity are imbedded in our legal philosophy.
They partake somewhat of dignity and decorum, somewhat of practical
administration, somewhat of the political desirability of an impregnable
legal citadel where government as distinct from its functions may operate
undisturbed by the demands of litigants.
54. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); The \Vestern Maid, 257 U.S.
419 (1922); Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1896).
5. Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675 (1927); Schillinger v.
United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.196 (1882);
United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S.(8 Pet.) 436 (1834); See also Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15,60 (1953) \Where J. Jackson in his dissenting opinion said:
[the decision would lead one to believe that] The ancient and discredited
doctrine that the King can do no wrong has not been uprooted; it has
merely been amended to read: The King can do only little wrongs.
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experienced and is experiencing a period of extensive ownership6 of
commercial ships (as distinguished from warships). The competition
between government and private shipping greatly favored the government,
since the government was in iio way liable to persons suffering injury from
government-owned ships unless it had waived immunity.
7
Whenever the above mentioned problem arises the question to be
resolved has always been: What constitutes a "suit" against the government?
The courts have been prone to designate virtually any dispute presented
before them as a "case" which requires the consent of the sovereign to
be sued. Thus, it has been held that a Bill of Review' and a Claim for
Credit9 are "suits".
Of course, the consent can be given only by Congress'0 and an
attempt by anyone other than Congress is void." Congress, in the granting
of this consent, is empowered to impose any conditions whatever 2 including
limitations on the amount of damages recoverable,' 3 and requirements
as to venue,' 4 interest,'5 court jurisdiction,' issuance of process,' 7 and
the filing of claims in a prescribed manner.'8
Courts have held the libelants to the highest degree of conformity
with these requirements, even though they be purely procedural,' 0 or
6. Table supplied by U.S. Dept. of Commerce Maritime Division, Statistics and
Special Studies Office.
Percent of Merchant
Number Number Vessels owned by
Date Private Vessels Government Vessels U.S. Government
1931 ... . 1,365 365 21%
1936 1,306 240 15%
1941 ...................... 1,108 76 7%
1946 644 3,778 85%
1951 1,288 2,085 62%
1955 ---.-.................. 1,087 2,140 66%
Note: This table of ships includes seagoing steam and motor merchant
vessels of 1,000 gross tons and over, inclusive of vessels on
the inland waterways, Great Lakes and those owned by the
United States Army and Navy and special types such as cable
ships, tugs, etc.
7. See Dec. Dig. Key 125.
8. United States v. Haas, 58 F. Stpp. 179 (N.D.N.Y. 1944).
9. United States v. Heard, 32 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Va. 1940).
10. Hidalgo Steel Co. v. Moore & M'Cormack Co., 298 Fed. 330 (4th Cir. 1924);
United States v. New York & O.S.S. Co., 216 Fed. 61 (2d Cir. 1914).
11. Hudson Trading Co. v. United States, 28 F.2d 744 (3rd Cir. 1928); Keil v.
United States, 65 F. Stipp. 431 (D. Md. 1946).
12. Treat v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 185 Fed. 760 (2d Cir. 1911).
13. North Atlantic & Gulf S.S. Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1954).
14. Miller v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 523 (W.D. \Wash. t948).
15. United States v. Jacobs, 63 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1933). cert. granted 289
U.S. 719 (1932); Radel Oyster Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Claims 817 (1934).
16. Henry Kaelin & Sons v. United States, 290 Fed. 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1923); The
Isonomia, 285 Fed. 5t6 (2d Cir. 1922).
17. Walton v. United States, 73 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1934); Mill Creek & Minehill
Nay. & Rr. Co. v. United States, 246 Fed. 1013 (E.D.Penn. 1917); Mount Tivy Winery
v. Lewis, 42 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Calif. 1942). But see United States v. American
Surety Co. of New York, 25 F. Stpp. 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
18 Fox v. Alcoa S.S. Co.. 143 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1944).
19. Crescitelli v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Penn. 1946).
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formal.20  Further, every rule of construction in the interpretation of
the consent given is in favor of the sovereign'.2  The rationale the courts
advance is that the government is giving up a right, and, therefore, the
courts should not take any more power than was expressly relinquished.22
The consent to suit which Congress declared has been held to be a
privilege accorded the libelant and not a property right within the purview
of the Fifth Amendment.2 3  Upon the basis of this reasoning Congress
may, in its discretion, withdraw its consent even though a pecuniary
consideration has passed.2 4
The doctrine of sovereign immunity extends as well to suits against
property held by the government,25 on grounds of public policy 26 or by
statute.27 This doctrine prevents suits against the personified ships owned
and operated by the government.
28
LEGISLATION
A statute enacted in 191629 completely reversed the previous rule as
to the sovereign's suability.30 By this Act, any vessel owned and operated
by the United States was to be hcld to the same duties and liabilities as
privately owned competing vessels. It took only four years for Congress
to decide that this was not a workable piece of legislation, since the
harassment from liens, etc. against government owned ships, outweighed
the rights given to the injured. Congress then passed the Suits in Admiralty
Act 3l superseding the prior act. The latter act had the effect of releasing
incumbrances on government owned ships by eliminating in rem actions
and substituting actions in persnam. Viewed in the light of the purpose
of an in rem action (i.e., to secure a reliable source from which the pay-
ment may be made after a verdict), a lien is quite unnecessary against the
United States. 2
20. California Casualty Indemnity Exch. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 404
(S.D. Calif. 1947).
21. McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951); Rodincinc v. United States,
74 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Penn. 1947).
22. Liberty Class Co. v. Jones, 66 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Okla. 1946).
23. Imhoff-Berg Silk Dyeing Co. v. United States, 43 F.2d 836 (D. N.J. 1930).
24. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Ginochio v. United States
74 F.2d 42 (7th Cir. 1934).
25. Moon v. Hines, 87 So. 603, 205 Ala. 355 (1921) Holding the government
liability was not distinguishable between suits directly against the government and those
against its property.
26. The Aussa, 52 F. Supp. 927 (D. N.J. 1943).
27. 41 Stat. 525 (1920); 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1952); Johansen v. United
States, 343 U.S, 427 1952).
28. Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1892).
29. 39 STAT. 728 (1918), 46 U.S.C. 801 (1952).
30. The Lake Monroe 250 US. 246 (1919).
31. 41 STAT. 525 (1920); 46 U.S.C. 741 (1952).
32. But see infra note 97.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
It must be pointed out, however, that this Act in no way gave rise
to a new cause of action, but merely created new remedies.3 3  The policy
of the Act was to allow the government to move more freely in Admiralty
matters by relieving it from the aforementioned inconveniences.
The draftsmanship of the Act was not clear and controversy arose as
to the interpretation of that portion of the Act which provided that a
proceeding in personam could be maintained, "Where a proceeding in
Admiralty could be maintained."34 There were three possible interpretations
of the words quoted above: 1) Suits exclusively in ren, 2) Suits optionally
in rem or in personam, or 3) Suits exclusively in personam. Because actions
in Admiralty had been in rein it was clear the Act applied to the two former
possibilities. After a short period of indecision, it was resolved that the
Act was intended to broaden the rights of the injured and upon that
reasoning the courts held that the Act encompased actions exclusively in
personan, a3 as well as the other two categories.
The scope of the Act was very broad both as to type of injury and
ships to be covered. "Thus injuries received from the cargo of the ship36
or the ship itself : 7 were actionable even though the ship was registered
in a foreign country, so long as the ship was owned and controlled by the
United States.38
Most courts have held that consent, when given, is to be strictly
construed, 3 even in such a broad grant of rights as the Suits in Admiralty
Act.40 Thus the court will on its own motion, without the defense being
pleaded by the government counsel, preserve the consent requireinent. 4'
It is an addiitonal requirement that the Iibelant must show the
ship's ownership and control lay in the government, though this requisite
need not be met on the date of filing.4 2  There need be no showing of
the present active use by the government of a merchant vessel, but, rather,
33. United States v. Loyola, 161 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1947); Crescitelli v. United
States, 66 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Penn. 1946); Pinerio v. United States, 65 F. Supp.
191 (N.D. Calif. 1945).
34. 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 742 (1952).
35. Nahsmeh v. United States, 267 U.S. 122 (19251; United States v. The
Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924); Markle v. United States, 8 F.2d 87 (S.D. Tex. 1925);
Sawyer v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
36. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. United States, 176 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1949).
37. Balboa Co. v. Standard Fruit & S.S. Co., 85 F. Stpp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
38. Caldarola v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Panamanian
Registry).
39. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); Jentry v. United
States, 73 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Calif. 1947); cf. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United
States, 167 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948). But see Niagra Fire Ins. Co. v. United States,
76 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Contra United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501
(1940) "When authority [to sue] is given, it is liberally construed."
40. Kruhmin v. United States War Shipping Adm., 81 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.
Penn. 1949).
41. Rodincuic v. United States, 175 F.2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1949).
42. Eastern S.S. Lines v. United States, 187 F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1951); McWilliams
Dredging Co. v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. La. 1952).
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it is enough that the ship had a commercial character at the time the cause
of action arose.
43
The liability of the government was further extended, by the Public
Vessels Act of 1925, 44 to all vessels owned and operated by the United
States Government. This Act, similar to the Suits in Admiralty Act,
applied only to ships not covered by the statute.
The fact that the forms of action were determined by two similar
but independent statutes raised a problem concerning which Act was to
be used in each particular case. The court in The Sainovar'5 held that a
ship owned by the United States, assigned to the Army and carrying Lend-
Lease supplies was a "public vessel" rather than a "merchant vessel" and,
therefore, was within the purview of the Pubic Vessels Act. A vessel under
control of the Navy and used for the transportation of personnel and
supplies was held to be a "public vessel" and thus within the Public
Vessels Act. 46  Conversely, the court determined that a privately-owned
ship chartered to the War Shipping Administration was "operated for
the United States" within the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act.47
Smilarly, a ship under a one-trip charter for its carrying capacity to the
Unted States was held to lie within the purview of the Suits in Admiralty
Act, although the owner was operating the ship (for his own profit) with
his own crew under his exclusive control.48  The fact that a ship owned
by the government was loaned to a state has been held not to affect the
classification of a "public vessel". 49  Military vessels are by their very
nature public vessels, within this statute.",
Perhaps the best illustration of the distinction between public and
merchant vessels was pointed out by the court in Geo. V. Rogers Const.
Corp. v. United States.5' The court here differentiated between ships
owned and operated by the United States, carrying no private shipper's
cargo, and those ships carrying such cargo; the former were held to be
within the Public Vessels Act, and the latter within the Suits in Admiralty
Act.
A further distinction was made in Prudential S.S. Corp. v. United
States,52 where the court held that cargo shipped by the United States
on a merchant vessel carrying other private cargo, did not justify general
43. American Surety Co. of New York v. United States, 112 F.2d 903 (10th
Cir. 1940).
44. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. 781 (1952).
45. 72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Calif. 1947).
46. Roeper v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
47. Epstein v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
48. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 103 F. Supp 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
49. Abbott v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 801 (Ct Claims 1953).
50. Page v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.La. 1952).
51. 118 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
52. 122 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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average recovery against the United States, as the vessel was not "owned
by or operated for the United States."
Once a case has been determined to be within the scope of a particular
Act, the right must be decided by that Act, since the remedies of each
statute are mutually exclusive.53  This does not mean that all causes of
action must lie within these two acts, for there are certain maritime torts
which do not fall within either, yct which remain actionable. 4
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Jurisdiction
Once the consent to suit has been given, the problem of jurisdiction
then arises. It has been held that by the mere creation of a right against
itself, the government does not thereby obligate itself to provide a
remedy for the enforcement of that right.r15 Even though a remedy has
been given,50 it may vary materially from the method of gaining judgment.
The reason the courts advance is that there is no implied contract that
Congress will perform any subsequent acts, such as appropriating the
money with which to pay the judgment.
The remedy of an action in personani given by the Public Vessels
Act and by the Suits in Admiralty Act has been held to be exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the district courts." Though an action is always
brought in personarn under these Acts, the libelant may, (provided he
would have been permitted to do so if suing a privately-owned ship)
request that the suit be conducted according to the principles of actions
in rei. 8  The jurisdiction then nust be established according to rules
applicable to such actions; for example, by bringing suit in the district
where the vessel is located." If the libelant brings suit where he is not a
53. Untersinger v, United States, 172 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1949); Isbrandtsen Co.
v. United States, 123 F. Supp 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
54. Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951);
Moran v. United States, 102 F. Stpp. 275 (D. Conn. 1951).
55. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 289 (1944); United States v. Mellon, 32 F.2d
415 (D.C. 1929).
56. Dismake v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 172 (1936) ("It may withhold
all remedy or it may provide an administrative remedy and make it exclusive, however
mistaken its exercise"); Morgan v. Unitcd States, 115 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1940);
Renfrew Mfg. Co. v. United States, 53 F.2d 404 (D. Mass. 1931).
57. Weinstein v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 40 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1930);
Hetfield v. United States, 78 Ct. Claims 419 (1933); cf. Johnson v. Fleet Corp.,
280 U.S. 320 (1930) (The Court of Claims now has jurisdiction to try causes of
action not tryable under the Suits in Admiralty Act or the Public Vessels Act). But see
Byron Brown Ralston v. United States, 91 Ct. Claims 91 (1940) cert. denied 311
U.S. 687 (1940).
58. The form is essentially the same as a proceeding in rem against an individual
owner. See BENEDICT oN ADMIRALTY, Vol. 2, p. 309.
59. Nahmeh v. United States, 267 U.S. 122 (1925); Villard Sutherland & Co.
v. United States, 8 F.2d 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); The Cape Fear, 8 F.2d 80 (S.D.N.Y.
1923); The isonomia, 285 Fed. 516 (2d Cir. 1922); Alsberg v. United States, 285
Fed. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); though the locus of the vessel is not the only place action
may be maintained, McWilliams Dredging Co, v. United States, 105 F. Stpp. 582
(E.D.La. 1952); cf. The Mount Shasta, 291 Fed. 92 (D. Mass. 1923).
COMMENT
resident or where the vessel is not located, the suit must fail,60 although
a subsequent appearance of the vessel in the district cures the defect.6 '
Some difficulty has been encountered in distinguishing between juris-
diction and venue. The court in Brailas v. United States, 2 clarified this
problem; they held that the statutory provision authorizing a libel in
personam against the United States related to jurisdiction while the pro-
vision regarding suit to be brought in the district in which the party suing
resides or in which the vessel sought to be charged with liability is found
related to venue.
Venue
In an action in personam a suit may be maintained in the district
where the libelant resides, or where his principal place of business is
located or where the vessel sought to be charged is found.6 3 While it is
true the mere residence of the libelant is sufficient to maintain the action,0'
it has been held the residence must be a voluntary one and the forced
hospitalization of a seaman does not establish proper residence for his
maintenance of the action. 5
If the libelant brings suit in personam in a district in which he is
not a resident, a general appearance by the government constitutes a
waiver of venue,60 though the government may also waive this defense by
failing to object until the day of trial." If the libelant brings his action
in rem and, in the alternative, in personam, a general appearance by the
United States does not preclude the libelant from amending his compliant
to set forth his cause of action solely in personam.68 If however, the action,
by its nature, is in rem, an appearance will not prevent the government
from raising an objection to the venue even after trial. 9
Parties
The mere fact that agencies or instrumentalities of the United States
do its work does not, of course, entitle them to immuniy from non
consensual suit.70 As the agencies are not immune because of title, the
60. Preussler v. United States, 102 F. Stpp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
61. Itoiness v. United States, 335 U.S. 297 (1948); Grant v. United States War
Shipping Adm., 65 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Penn. 1945). But see Sclinell v. United States,
166 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1948) in an action in rein in nature.
62. 79 F. Cupp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
63. Galban Lobo & Co. v. United States, I8 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1927).
64. Carroll v. United States, 133 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1943); '[lhe Anna E. Morse,
287 Fed. 364 (S.I). Ala. 1923); Simonsen v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Penn.
1937).
65. Abbott v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
66. Willard Sutherland & Co. v. United States. supra note 59: Silk v. United
States War Shipping Adm., 79 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Penn. 1948).
67. Brailas v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
68. '[he West Tacook, 1924 A.M.C. 168 (1923).
69. Willard Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 8 F.2d 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
70. Keifer & Keifer v. R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
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officials71 serving in these agencies, to be immunized, must be acting in
their authorized official capacity at the time of the creation of the cause
of action."
Whether or not the government is the real defendant in an action
is determined, not by merely looking to the parties listed in the pleadings,
but rather by examining the prospective effect upon the defendant, were
the libelant to win. If the government would be forced to act, either
directly or indirectly, then the government is the real party in interest7 3
Thus, the fact that the United States is not named as defendant, but
has an interest so directly involved that it in fact 7 4 is the real party in
interest is enough to require that the government give its consent before
suit may be maintained?
5
If the defendant in question is an agency of the government, the
courts look behind the nominal party and treat the case as one against
the government itself,T though in the converse situation the government
may maintain an action independently rather than through an instru-
mentality of its ereatoin.77
There has been little controversy when the government has possession
of the ships and is using them for a public purpose, since Congress has
clearly provided for liability in such cases.76 Statutes also provide for
the liability of corporate affiliates of the Unitcd Statcs owning and operating
maritime vessels, 71' such affiliates being liable in personaman °0  Therefore,
for example, the United States Shipping Board Emcrgcncy Fleet Corpora-
tion may sue8' or be sued as a private corporation, although the United
States is the sole owner of stock in that corporation2 'Ihis is true not-
71. Mitchell v. Haines, 17 N.J. Misc. 123, 125, 5 A.2d 680,681 (1939) ("Immunity
from suit on the part of federal officers extends only to such individuals as are strictly
public officers and who arc an integral part of governmental agencies in the administration
of governmental functions").
72. Bell v. flood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Calif. 1947); Applegate v. Applegate,
39 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Va. 1941).
73. United States v. Ickes, 70 F.2d 771, 773 (D.C. 1934) ("It is elementary
that, where the purpose of a suit is in effect to enforce the specific performance of a
contract, this cannot be accomplished by indirect actions, either against federal officers
or by mandamus"); Sehevitzky v. [iome Owners' Loan Corp., 26 F. Stpp. 311
(E.D. Mo. 1939).
74. After a full disclosure of the record. Lambert v. R.F.C., 71 F. Supp. 509
(E.D.N.Y.. 1947).
75. Mine Safety v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945).
76. Union Nat. Bank of Clarksburg, W. Va. v. McDonald, 36 F. Supp. 46
N,DW.Va. 1940).
77. Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, 159 F.2d 699 (4th
Cir. 1947).
78. 41 STATr. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 741 (1952); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro,
271 U.S. 562 (1926); The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922); Ex Parte New York.
No. 2, 256 U.S. 503 (1921).
79. 41 STA-r. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 741 (1952). This statute applied of
course to liability of ships subsequently acquired after passage of the Act. Sevin v.
Inland Waterways Corp., 88 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1937).
80. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 742 (1952).
81. Supra note 77.
82. United States %. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 113 F.2d 301 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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withstanding the fact that the ships are leased to a private corporation
and the private corporation is sued, as long as the action is not onc
in rem." The fact that the United States would ultimately have to pay
is no defense. To secure immunity, satisfactory evidence must be offered
that the United States has chartered and maintained control over a private
ship. 4
The most difficult problem in this area concerns the rights and liabilities
under leases of ships from the government. The leases usually constitute
"General Agency Agreement' 8 5 contracts. The question then becomes:
who is the employer of the injured employee, the government or the
lessee. The Supreme Court has held the lessee accountable for his own
misconduct 6 and extended his liability further in Hust v. Moore-McCor-
mack Lines,"7 by allowing the injured party to sue the lessee even though
he had no de facto control over the injured party. This view was modified
by the Clarification Act of 1943 and the government 8 was held accountable
for the maintenance, cure, etc. of injured seaman.8 9
The question of comity briefly enters this field when a foreign national
brings suit against the United States. Before he can recover he must
show that his country, in a like situation, would afford recovery to a United
States citizen. In the event le fails to do so lie cannot recover.90
Damages
The United States in granting the right to sue may limit the amount
of damages recoverable, 9 ' or may provide the same measure of damages
as would be assessed against a private individual? 2
The provision for "damages" in a statute does not limit the scope
of the statute for it has been held that "damages" means compensation
for any kind of injury, be it tort or contract."3 The courts have likewise
broadly interpreted the coverage of the statute to include virtually any
type of injury suffered. Therefore, it has been held that recoverable damages
do not have to be inflicted by the ship itself, but may arise from the
operation of the ship,0 4
83. Brady v. Rosevelt S.S.Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943); The Fenn Victory, 75 F.
Supp. 701 (W.D. Wash. 1947); See also, Carroll v. United States, 133 F.2d 690
(2d Cir. 1943).
84. Cleary Bros. v. Christie Scow Corp., 215 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1954).
85. For a thorough presentation and discussion of this problem see 5 YALE L.J.
584 (1896).
86. Brady v. Rosevelt S.S. Co. Supra note 84.
87. 328 U.S. 707 (1946).
88. 57 STAT. 45 (1943), 50 U.S.C. 129 (1952).
89. Cosmopolitan Co. v. NIcallister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949) distinguishing Brady
v. Rosevelt supra note 87.
90. Maiorino v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (An Italian);
Lopez v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (A Cuban)
91. North Atlantic & Gulf S.S. Co v. United States, 209 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1953).
92. U.S. Ex Re Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
93. Thompson v. United States, 184 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1950).
94. Ibid.
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If the libelant has insurance and has recovered upon that insurance
for an interest he has lost, he may nevertheless sue the government 5 The
doctrine of subrogation comes into effect and any damages the libelant
recovers, up to the amount he received from the insurer, will be held for
the insurer.
When the right to damages has been established, the fact that
Congress fails to appropriate money does not prevent recovery of a judg-
mentY0  The fact that the damages are mathematically impossible to
determine accurately likewise does not bar recovery."
While the general rule is that the United States does not pay court
costs,98 it is held that the government may recover them against its
opponents.99 This is true even though the United States dismisses the
action. 00 Attorney's fees are generally treated according to the same
rules as costs. If the fees were made an element of damages by agreement,
however, the United States will be held to the same extent as a private
individual.101
In determining the right of damages against the government, the
United States is allowed the right of set off,102 in the same manner as
set off is allowed to an individual.101
The court in Pennell v. United States0 4 stated the general rule for
the recovery of interest from the United States:
As a general principle, it has become the established rule of the
Supreme Court that interest is not allowed on claims against the
government . , . . [T]he only recognized exceptions to this rule
are where the government stipulates to pay interest and where
interest is given expressly by act of Congress, either by the name of
interest' or under that of 'damages'. 105
95. Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Va.
1948).
96. Byron Brown Ralston v. United States, 91 Ct. Claims 91,96 (1940) ". - we
have often held that where the right of compensation exists the failure to make appro.
priation therefore will not in itself deny that right"
97. Beacon Oyster Co. v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 761 (Ct. Claims 1946).
98. United States v. 'Worley, 281 U.S. 339 (1930); United States v. Poling
Russell Inc., 212 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. Jacobs, 63 F.2d 326
(5th Cir. 1953); O'Boyle v. United States, 49 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1931).
99. United States v. Jardine, 81 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1936).
100. United States v. National Biscuit Co., 25 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
101. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 156 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1946).
102. Seaboard Surety Co. v. United States, 67 F. Snpp. 969 (Ct. Claims 1946).
103. United States v. U.S. Fidelity Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); United States v.
Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
104. 162 Fed. 75 (DAle. 1908).
105. Id. at 78.
COMMENT
While this principle has been applied in the majority of cases""' it has
been held that by bringing suit, the United States subjects itself to interest
charges arising therefrom.' 07
CONCLUSION
Although one may question the soundness of such a policy, it goes
without saying that the United States government has established for
itself the legal right to enter the area of what was once private business. 0 s
\Vhen the government does enter this area, especially on the scale it has
in the Admiralty field,")' certain of its sovereign rights must be abandoned" 0
for the sake of fairness to competing private shipowners. Paramount among
these rights is the immunity of a sovereign from suit. As Judge Bowen in
The Beaton Park"' stated:
In this country our theory as to the government in business is
that when our Government enters upon an ordinary business
undertaking, such as operation of merchant ships, it does so
under the same liabilities and responsibilities as private individuals
when they engage in the same kind of business; and Congress has
iven consent for the institution of legal action by those aggrieved
or the enforcement of such liabilities of the Government. In
respect to merchant ship operation, we do not recognize the
Government as having immunity from suit."l 2
True, the United States ought to be afforded the same rights as
private individuals," s but no additional rights should be given which place
the government in a superior position. The rights should not be broadened
106. Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41 (1928); Warren Gordon
Lighterage Co. v.. McAllister Towing & Transportation Co., 12 F.2d 779 (S.D.N.Y.
1926)(Interest held not allowable from U.S., when U.S. has chartered a vessel, though
the charterer is liable); Watts v. United States, 129 Fed. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1904).
107. United States v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924).
108. See Mills & Long, The Statistical Agencies of the Federal Government
(1949)---evaluating statistically such fields as old age insurance (Social Security),
Finance (Housing and Home Finance Agency), Public Utilities (Federal Power Com-
mission), Banking (Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.).
109. See table, note 6 su~ra.
110. United States v. State Bank, 96 U.S. 30 (1877); Walker v. United States,
139 Fed. 409 (M.D. Ala. 1905) aff'd. 148 Fed. 1022 (5th Cir. 1906) (Courts are
under a right and duty to withhold relief from a sovereign except upon terms which
do justice to the citizens or subjects); Kirkendall v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 766,
770 (Ct. Claims 1940). "An action will lie whenever the defendant has received
money which is the property of the plaintiff, and which the defendant is obliged by
natural justice and equity to refund. The form of the indebtedness or the mode in which
it was occurred is immaterial".
111. 65 F. Supp. 211 (V.I). Wash. 1946).
112. Id at 110.
113. 41 STAT. 527 (1920); 46 U.S.C. 746 (1952). "The United States shall
be entitled to the benefits of all exceptions and of all limitations of liability accorded
by law to the owners, charterers, operators or agents of vessels."
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by classification of procedure," 4 evidence, 115 or an extra judicial matter.116
The government when in a business should be held accountable to the
same extent as a businessman.
PmLiP W. KNIGHT
114. Mosseller v. United States, 158 F.2d 380, 382 (2d Cir. 1946)("Having
consented to suit, the United States should be held to have placed itself in the
position of an ordinary litigant before the court, to whom the rules of civil procedure
ordinarily apply"); United States v. Anglin & Stevenson, 145 F.2d 622 (10th Cir.
1944); Meilino v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)("The general
policy of the law that amendments shall be freely allowed in order that justice may
be done is as applicable to the government, Admiralty Rule 23 as defendant as it
is to any other defendant"); 79 F. Supp. 450, 452 (W.D. La. 1948) ". . . the
government in its pleadings, and particularly in the making of judicial admissions,
should be held to the same manner that the private person or corporation is held."
115. American-Hawaiian S.S. Go. v. United States, 191 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.
1951) ("No reason is apparent to us why the government should not be treated as
any private litigant in applying the rule that available evidence, if it is to be used,
must be brought forward at the trial"); United States v. Bransen, 142 F.2d 232
(9th Cir. 1944).
116. Daitz Flying Corp. v. United States, 4 F.R.D. 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1945)(In
an action against the government, its attorney directed to appear for pre-trial con-
ference must do so, and if he does not the government is subject to the same extent
as private litigants and is also bound by its attorney agreements or admissions at
such a conference to the same degree as a private libelant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16).
